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TOWARDS RENDERING NEW YORK'S
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE REDUNDANT:
SHAD ALLIANCE v. SMITH HA VEN MALL
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
the states are free to expand the scope of their constitutional guar-
antees beyond that afforded by the federal Constitution.1 States
embarking on such a path often have relied on differences between
state constitutional provisions and their federal counterparts as
grounds sufficient to warrant a broader interpretation.2 In recent
I See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); see also Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 502
(1977) ("decisions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques-
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law"); Force, State
"Bills of Rights'" A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REv. 125,
129 (1969) (Supreme Court decisions provide only minimum level of protection).
Reliance on state constitutions is largely the product of the evolution of constitutional
doctrines. See Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1327-28 (1982)[hereinafter Developments in the Law]. While
the federal Bill of Rights was not initially applicable to state governments, see Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), it was later selectively incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the states. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 436 (11th ed. 1985); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-69
(1978) (listing guarantees made applicable to states). Little attention was given to state bills
of rights during the Warren Court years when a significant part of the incorporation took
place. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REV. 873, 878 (1976); Project Report: Toward An Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 272 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report].
The advent of the Burger Court, however, has been viewed as a retreat in the area of
individual liberties, see Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 421 (1974); Project Report, supra, at 272,
leading many commentators to urge greater reliance on state constitutions. See Develop-
ments in the Law, supra, at 1328-29 & n.20 (listing over 25 articles indicating renewed inter-
est in state bills of rights).
Although the increased reliance on state court provisions has been applauded by many,
this movement is not without its critics. See People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 940-42, 538
P.2d 237, 245-46, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117-18 (1975) (Clarke, J., dissenting); see also Collins,
Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981)(criticizing use of state constitutions merely to circumvent disfavored Su-
preme Court precedent); Frohmeyer, A.G.'s Mixed Emotions, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at
54-6, col. 2 (same).
2 See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975)(reliance on privacy
amendment to state constitution and unique character of state); Baker v. City of Fairbanks,
471 P.2d 386, 399-401 (Alaska 1970)(reliance on history); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
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years, there has been debate over whether those differences are be-
ing relied upon to support principled, independent interpretations
or merely to circumvent disfavored Supreme Court precedent.3
Particularly controversial have been the free speech provisions
of state constitutions, as state court litigants have increasingly
urged broad interpretations of those provisions in order to obtain
relief foreclosed under the first amendment of the federal Consti-
634, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155 (en banc) (reliance on semantic differ-
ence)(overruled by initiative amendment CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 983
(1972); Hendershot v. Hendershot, 263 S.E.2d 90, 93-95 (W. Va. 1980) (reliance on state
historical traditions).
One commentator has listed several significant factors considered by state courts when
departing from federal standards:
(1) distinctive provisions of the state constitution that recognize rights not identi-
fied in the federal Constitution or that characterize particular rights in a signifi-
cantly different way; (2) distinctive features of a state's history, particularly cir-
cumstances surrounding the adoption of the relevant state constitutional provision
that can be used to guide textual interpretation; (3) previously established bodies
of state law, independent of federal law, that establish or suggest distinctive state
constitutional rights; and (4) distinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry.
Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1361 (footnotes omitted); see also Howard, supra
note 1, at 935-37 (factors contributing to reliance on state constitutions); Project Report,
supra note 1, at 315-17 (factors contributing to reliance on state constitutions).
I Compare Brennan, supra note 1, at 503 ("[w]ith federal scrutiny diminished, state
courts must respond by increasing their own") and Wilkes, supra note 1, at 434 (positing
state constitutions as sources employed to evade Supreme Court rulings) and Note, Private
Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 184-88 (1980) (cham-
pioning "reactive" approach, utilizing state constitutional provisions to skirt disfavored Su-
preme Court rulings) [hereinafter Note, Private Abridgment] with Confins, Reliance on
State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 3-5,
9-19 (1981) (criticizing Note, Private Abridgement, supra, and urging employment of state
charters on principled, doctrinal basis) and Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Princi-
pled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REv. 297, 321 (1977) (criticizing
reactive interpretation and urging principled, independent interpretations) [hereinafter
Note, The New Federalism].
One commentator has pointed out that dissatisfaction with federal precedent is often
the most significant factor in stimulating states to expand their constitutional guarantees.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1359. This is so, even though this is the
factor with which courts and commentators have been most uncomfortable. See id. This
discomfort stems from both the feeling that the position of the Supreme Court as final
arbiter of constitutional issues will be undermined, and from a distaste for the unprincipled
decisionmaking that second-guessing invites. See id. Federal precedent, however, is not un-
dermined because our federal structure provides two levels of constitutional protection, and
in addition, disagreement with federal results can be just as principled as any other reason-
ing. See id.
Another factor is that the Supreme Court has expressly condoned such divergence. See
supra note 1; cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country").
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tution.4 A number of state courts, relying on both semantic differ-
ences between their state and the federal speech clauses5 and the
preferred position of speech,6 have held that their state provisions
allow the exercise of certain speech-related activities on private
property.7 Such conduct is not protected by the first amendment.8
4 See Cologne v. Westfarms Ass'n. 192 Conn. 48, 50-56, 469 A.2d 1201, 1202-05 (1984)
(seeking protection to solicit signatures at shopping mall); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l.
Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 84-85, 445 N.E.2d 590, 590-91 (1983)(same); Woodland v. Michigan Citi-
zens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 193-95, 378 N.W.2d 337, 338-42 (1985)(seeking protection to
distribute political literature on grounds of private university); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,
538-42, 423 A.2d 615, 616-18 (1980) (same), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 162-66, 432 A.2d 1382,
1383-85 (1981) (leafletting on university campus); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 233, 635 P.2d 108, 110 (1981) (seeking protection to solicit signa-
tures at shopping mall); see generally Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3, at 174-82
(proposing that state constitutional guarantees of free speech compliment the first
amendment).
5 The first amendment states its protection in the negative, see U.S. CONsT. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech or of the press"), while 39
state constitutions, including New York's, see N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("Every citizen may
freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.. ."), affirmatively grant freedom of speech. See Note, Free Speech, The
Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 541 (1982). It has been noted
that the affirmative language in those provisions makes them particularly susceptible to
broader interpretations. See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1399-1400; Note,
Private Abridgement, supra note 3, at 179-81. Notwithstanding this affirmative language,
states have largely failed to utilize their free speech provisions to expand upon the rights
granted under the federal Constitution. See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at
1400-01.
0 See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 558, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (1980) ("speech...
occupies a preferred position in our system of constitutionally-protected interests") (quoting
State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 411, 416 A.2d 821, 826 (1980)); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington
Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 244, 635 P.2d 108, 116 (1981) ("The exercise of free speech
is given great weight in the balance, because it is a preferred right."). The idea that speech
occupies a preferred position has been stated by the Supreme Court many times. See, e.g.,
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
7 See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341,
347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) (solicitation of signatures permitted at shopping mall
under state free speech clause), af'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 568-
69, 423 A.2d 615, 636-37 (1980) (distribution of political literature by non-student on private
university grounds protected by state free speech clause), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 173-
75, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390-91 (1981)(leafleteers permitted on private university grounds under
state free speech clause).
8 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980). Speech-related
activity on private property initially was recognized as being protected by the first amend-
ment in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where the Supreme Court held that a com-
pany owned town could not prohibit handbilling on its "business block," which served as
the community shopping center, because the operation of the town was a "public function."
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Other state courts, however, have declined such expansive inter-
pretations, finding semantic differences insignificant and asserting
that the question of speech-related activity on private property is
one properly left to the legislature.9 Recently, in SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall,10 the New York Court of Appeals, joining a
Id. at 506. The Court considered the acts of the town as those of a government, thus the
necessary "state action" was present, making the handbillers' activities protected by the
first amendment. See id. at 507-08.
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the
Court considered whether the reasoning of Marsh should be extended to protect expressive
activities at a shopping mall. Finding the business district and the shopping center to be
"functional equivalents," id. at 319, the Court held that state action was involved when
labor activists were prohibited from picketing a store within the mall. The Court thus con-
cluded that picketing within a private shopping mall "in a manner and for a purpose gener-
ally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put," was protected by the first
amendment. Id. at 319-20. Logan Valley was significant because it "extended the public
function doctrine to reach private conduct when state action was less obvious and pervasive
than that found in Marsh." Note, Access to Private Fora and State Constitutions: A Pro-
posed Speech and Property Analysis, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1501, 1508 (1982).
Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the Court limited Lo-
gan Valley by holding that handbilling at a private shopping mall is not protected under
the first amendment when that expressive activity is unrelated to the commercial purpose of
the shopping mall. See id. at 569-70. Contrasting Logan Valley, the Lloyd court asserted
that the expressive anti-war activities involved were not related to the commercial purpose
of the mall and that they could have been carried out elsewhere. See id. at 569-70.
Finally, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court expressly overruled Logan
Valley, holding that labor picketers had no first amendment right of access to a shopping
mall. See id. at 518. The Court asserted that Marsh was an exception to the state action
requirement and concluded that the public function doctrine has no application to shopping
malls. See id. at 521. One commentator has noted that although Marsh was left intact after
Hudgens, the Court "probably has confined it exclusively to its facts." Note, Private
Abridgment, supra note 3, at 173 n.42.
Notwithstanding the lack of first amendment protection accorded to speech-related ac-
tivities at shopping malls, the Supreme Court, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980), held that such activities may be protected by the states through their free
speech clauses. See id. at 87-88. The Supreme Court of California held that the solicitation
of signatures for a pro-Zionist cause at a shopping mall was protected under California's free
speech provision. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d
341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that neither the fifth amendment property rights nor the first amendment speech rights of
the shopping center owners were infringed by the California Supreme Court's recognition of
the right to exercise free speech rights at the shopping mall. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88.
' See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarm Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 61-66, 469 A.2d 1201, 1208-10
(1984)(finding semantic differences insignificant and asserting that legislatures, not courts,
should provide access to private shopping mall for leafleteers); Woodland v. Michigan Citi-
zens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 233-35, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344, 357 (1985)(same); State v. Felmet,
302 N.C. 173, 177-78, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1981) (no state constitutional protection for
solicitation at private shopping mall because same activity foreclosed under first
amendment).
'0 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
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growing number of state courts that have refused to interpret their
state free speech clauses more broadly than the first amendment,1
held that leafleteers have no right of access to a privately owned
shopping mall. 2
In SHAD Alliance, the plaintiffs, antinuclear activists,13
sought to distribute leaflets at the privately owned Smith Haven
Mall ("Mall"). 4 After twice being informed of the Mall's policy
prohibiting leafletting and after being directed to cease their activ-
ities,' 5 plaintiffs brought suit under the New York Constitution
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compelling the Mall to
allow distribution of leaflets. 6
" See supra note 9. The most recent state supreme court cases addressing the issue of
access to private shopping malls have gone against finding a right of access, leading some to
suggest that this may constitute a trend. See, e.g., Klein, Another State Erects Barrier to
Shopping-Mall Leafletting, NAT'L L.J., January 13, 1986, at 6, col. 1; Lindsey, A Patchwork
of Rulings on Free Speech at Malls, N.Y. Times, February 10, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
,2 See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 507, 488 N.E.2d at 1218, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
11 Id. at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S. at 101. The plaintiffs, Paumonok People's
Organization ("PPO"), SHAD Alliance ("Sound-Hudson Against Atomic Develop-
ment-"SHAD") are groups opposed to the use of nuclear power, who seek to further their
goals through education and non-violent action. SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 106
App. Div. 2d 189, 190, 484 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (2d Dep't 1985).
1 SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 498, 488 N.E.2d at 1212, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The
Smith Haven Mall is a large suburban shopping mall located in Suffolk County, Long Is-
land, and is owned and operated by the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Id. The
mall occupies approximately 97 acres and consists of over 125 stores, restaurants, and busi-
nesses. Id.
The mall was designed to encourage people to congregate and linger and provides over
80 promotional events each year. SHAD Alliance, 106 App. Div. 2d at 191, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
851. The mall also permits the use of its facilities for voter registration drives and provides
space for the mobile office of a local member of Congress. Id. The mall, however, does not
allow any pamphleting, political rallies, or similar functions. See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d
at 499 & n.2, 488 N.E.2d at 1212-13 & n.2, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01 & n.2. (Senator James
Buckley evicted from mall for campaigning in 1976).
,5 SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The
plaintiffs were standing under the portico outside the main entrance to the mall when they
were asked to leave. Id. at 509, 488 N.E.2d at 1219, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (Wachtler, C.J.,
dissenting).
11 Id. at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The plaintiffs claimed protection
under Article 1, §§ 7 & 8 of the New York Constitution. SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven
Mall, 118 Misc. 2d 841, 846-47, 462 N.Y.S.2d 344, 347-48 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1983).
Article 1, § 8 provides, in part- "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8
(McKinney 1982).
Article 1, § 9 provides, in part: "No law shall be passed abridging the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government, or any department thereof
... ." N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 9 (McKinney 1982).
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The Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County, found the
mall to be the functional equivalent of a town center, and held
that the free speech provision of the state constitution required
that the plaintiffs be allowed access to the mall. 17 A sharply di-
vided Appellate Division, adopting the reasoning of Special Term,
affirmed the plaintiffs' right to leaflet the mall."s A divided Court
of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court.'9
Judge Titone, writing for the majority, found the crux of the
plaintiffs' argument to be that no state action requirement existed
or should exist under the free speech clause of the state constitu-
tion.20 After examining traditional and contemporary approaches
to constitutional adjudication, however, Judge Titone concluded
that a state action requirement did exist because the constitution
was intended to protect against only governmental, and not pri-
vate, conduct.21 Judge Titone also noted that previous claims seek-
1" See SHAD Alliance, 118 Misc. 2d at 848-49, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49. At Special
Term, Justice Underwood, citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), emphasized the freedom that states enjoy to expand
their guarantees beyond those provided by the federal Constitution. See id. at 845, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 347. The court reasoned that because the characteristics of the mall approach
that of a public or quasi-public property, and because the intrusion by plaintiffs on the
mall's privacy right was small compared to plaintiffs' speech right, access was required, sub-
ject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. See id. at 848-49, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
348-49.
18 See SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 106 App. Div. 2d 189, 484 N.Y.S.2d 849
(2d Dep't) (3-2 decision), rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
The Appellate Division stressed that the New York free speech provision is stated affirma-
tively while the first amendment is stated negatively, and acknowledged that, although this
semantic difference may not be dispositive of the question whether the New York provision
protects against private action, "it does provide a basis for applying a more flexible [state
action] standard for determining what type of protection is to be afforded to free speech
than the standard imposed by the United States Supreme Court. . . ." SHAD Alliance, 106
App. Div. 2d at 199, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Adopting a distinct standard, the majority contin-
ued, bolsters the position that the state and federal free speech provisions are not simply
mirror images to be construed in pari materia. See id. at 200, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 857. The
court concluded that because the mall had taken on the characteristics of a business district
and because of its open invitation to the public, the mall must allow the leafletting, subject
to reasonable restrictions. See id. at 203, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Niehoff relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and concluded that since the mall was a private
actor, no state action was present and, thus, plaintiffs could not claim the protection of the
New York Constitution. See SHAD Alliance, 106 App. Div. 2d at 215, 216, 222, 484
N.Y.S.2d 867, 868, 872 (Niehoff, J., dissenting).
19 See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 496, 488 N.E.2d at 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
20 See id. at 500, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
21 See id. at 500-05, 488 N.E.2d at 1213-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101-05. The court first
noted that the free speech provision to the New York Constitution, added in 1821, was
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ing a right of access to private property under the New York free
speech clause had been rejected by the court.22
The court acknowledged that the modern approach to consti-
tutional adjudication would question how state action was to be
defined in novel contexts, but nonetheless refused to redefine New
York's state action doctrine in this factual setting.23 The majority
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the operation of a mall was
the functional equivalent of governmental conduct,24 and thus, ap-
plying a state action standard, concluded that state action was
absent.25
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Wachtler asserted that the
majority had unduly restricted the free speech provision of the
state constitution. 26 The dissent contended that because the mall
had assumed the characteristics of a traditional public forum, a
denial of access would inhibit the free expression of views in the
essentially based on the federal Bill of Rights. See id.
The court also observed that the legislative history indicated that the New York Bill of
Rights was aimed solely at governmental conduct. See id. (citing N. CARTER AND W. STONE,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821 163, 173). Judge
Titone also cited decisions of other state courts which had considered the scope of their free
speech clauses, and noted the opinions of several constitutional law scholars. See SHAD
Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 503, 488 N.E.2d at 1215, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 103. He concluded that the
notion that a constitution is intended to proscribe only governmental conduct "is not only
deeply rooted in constitutional tradition, it is at the foundation of the very nature of a
constitutional democracy." Id. The majority also asserted that the absence of a state action
requirement would have "mischievous consequences" because the court and not the legisla-
ture would assume the role of settling conflicting interests among citizens. See id. at 505,
488 N.E.2d at 1217, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
22 See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 502, 488 N.E.2d at 1215, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 103. The
court, citing People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976) and
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d
433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948), reaffirmed New York's policy of allowing private
property owners to exclude persons seeking to engage in expressive activities. See SHAD
Alliance 66 N.Y.2d at 502, 488 N.E.2d at 1215, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
23 See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 504, 488 N.E.2d at 1216, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
24 See id. at 506, 488 N.E.2d 1217, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105. The court distinguished Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), asserting that a shopping mall differs from a company
town in both structure and function. See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 506 n.7, 488 N.E.2d
at 1217 n.7, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105 n.7. In addition, the court pointed out that the mall is
inaccessible to the public after business hours and "does not perform 'the full spectrum of
municipal powers' or '[stand] in the shoes of the State."' Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
25 See SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 506, 488 N.E.2d at 1218, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105-06.
2" See id. at 514, 488 N.E.2d at 1223, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Wachtler pointed out that the majority had improperly dwelled on the absence
of "traditional indicia of State action set forth in the context of equal protection and due
process claims." Id.
1986]
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community, thereby satisfying the state action requirement of the
free speech clause." Asserting that the majority's reliance on the
history of the free speech clause was misplaced, Chief Judge Wach-
tler concluded that the absence of any specific intent with regard
to the state action requirement of the free speech clause, coupled
with the innovative nature of the state constitution, compelled
granting a right of access to those seeking to disseminate ideas at
the shopping mall.28
In denying leafleteers access to the shopping mall, the New
York Court of Appeals refused to depart from the state action
standard required by the federal Constitution. It is submitted,
however, that while the court was correct in concluding that some
state action need be shown, 29 its conclusion as to the proper stan-
27 See id. (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wachtler stressed the need to facili-
tate access to the public through "inexpensive channels of communication" in order to in-
sure effective expression. Id. at 512, 488 N.E. 2d at 1221, 498 N.Y.S. 2d at 109-10.
28 See id. at 510-14, 488 N.E.2d at 1220-23, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 108-11 (Wachtler, C.J.
dissenting). Chief Judge Wachtler pointed out that the discussion of the free speech provi-
sion at the 1821 convention was devoted almost exclusively to that part of the provision
concerning prosecution for libels. See id. at 510, 488 N.E.2d at 1220, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
The Chief Judge found it significant that, although the ratification of the first amendment
predated the 1821 Convention by 30 years, the drafters of the state free speech provision
chose to word that provision as an affirmative grant of free speech, followed by a separate
clause limiting legislative action. See id. The dissent noted the broad wording of the free
speech clause, and that the framers of this clause could not have envisioned the replacement
of town squares and business districts by shopping centers. See id. at 511, 488 N.E.2d at
1221, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
2' The state action doctrine has long established that most provisions of the Constitu-
tion protecting individual liberty-including the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment-impose restrictions only on government. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S.
SHIFFRIN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1090 (6th ed. 1986).
It is generally recognized that the state action doctrine serves two purposes: "First, by ex-
empting private action from the reach of the Constitution's prohibitions, it stops the Consti-
tution short of preempting individual liberty .... Second, the state action requirement
reinforces the two chief principles of division which organize the governmental structure
that the Constitution creates: federalism and the separation of powers." L. TRmE, supra
note 1, at 1149.
Several courts and commentators, however, have stressed the federalism argument be-
hind the state action doctrine and have asserted that the state action requirement does not
pertain to state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 559, 423 A.2d 615, 628
(1980) (federalism does not constrain state constitutional rights; thus restrictions permitted
on private activity); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242,
35 P.2d 108, 115 (1981) (federalism allows state courts to experiment); Skover, The Wash-
ington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 281-82 (1985) (no state action required under Washington Consti-
tution); Project Report, supra note 1, at 298 (federalism allows state regulation of private
activity); Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J.
522, 541-42 (1982) (principles of state action arising from concern for states' rights and fed-
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dard to be applied was not adequately supported. This Comment
will examine the SHAD Alliance approach and will suggest a more
flexible state action standard which the court could have applied.
Such a flexible standard under New York's free speech clause
would serve to protect important interests not similarly protected
under the first amendment.
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD
While the necessity of demonstrating state action is not often
questioned,30 parties involved in contemporary constitutional adju-
dication instead discuss how this concept should be defined in
novel contexts.3 1 It is submitted that the SHAD Alliance court
eralism not applicable to enforcement of state constitutions).
Several state courts have recently rejected the federalism argument, stressing that indi-
vidual liberty would be destroyed were state constitutions to apply to private activity. See
Cologne v. Westfarm Assoc., 192 Conn. 48, 61-66, 469 A.2d 1201, 1208-10 (1984); Western
Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 515 A.2d 1331, 1335
(1986). Taking a similar approach, the SHAD Alliance, majority stressed, inter alia, the
preservation of individual liberty as the justification for the state action requirement. See
SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 503, 488 N.E.2d at 1215-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 104. It is submit-
ted that this approach, requiring some state action, is correct. See Burke and Reber, State
Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1973).
30 The finding of state action is an initial hurdle for constitutional litigants. See J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-99 (1983). In order to demonstrate
state action, a party must prove a connection between the alleged wrongdoer and the gov-
ernment. Id. Thus, the ability to prove that the wrongdoing was connected with the state
will determine the success or failure of the constitutional claim. Id. In recent years, the
concept of state action under the federal Constitution has been greatly revitalized, with
parties required to demonstrate significant state involvement in order to keep their consti-
tutional claim alive. Id.; see generally Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Con-
gressional Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REv. 479 (1975) (critical
analysis of Burger Court's approach to state action doctrine). By revitalizing the state action
concept, the courts have reduced the number of contexts in which state action will be found.
SI See, e.g., Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337
(1985)(state action requirement in speech setting); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45
N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978)(urging relaxed state action require-
ment under state due process clause in setting involving possessory liens); Alderwood As-
socs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 653 P.2d 108 (1981)(Dolliver, J., con-
curring)(urging relaxation of state action requirement in speech setting); see also, Note,
Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Malling" of Constitutional
Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 93, 118 (1983) (urging relaxed state action requirement for speech
at shopping malls); Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3, at 174 (urging relaxed defini-
tion of state action where free speech is involved); but see Skover, supra note 29 (urging no
state action requirement under state constitution). See generally Note, State Action: Theo-
ries for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656
(1974)(analysis of state action doctrine based on policies, rights and remedies involved).
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failed to address adequately whether New York case law called for
the application of a state action standard more relaxed than that
required by the federal Constitution. Instead, the court merely ap-
plied the federal state action standard referred to, yet not fully
applied, in Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac.3 2
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac&3 involved federal and state
due process challenges to the statutory authorization afforded a ga-
rageman to foreclose his possessory lien for repair and storage
charges.3 4 The Sharrock court examined the various factors consid-
ered in determining the presence or absence of state action,3 5 and
concluded that the application of those factors would bar recovery
under the federal due process clause because there was no state
action under federal standards.3 6
The Sharrock court observed, however, that while an activity
might not constitute state action for the purposes of the federal
Constitution, the same result would not necessarily obtain if that
conduct was claimed to violate the state constitution.3 7 The Shar-
rock court noted that New York cases interpreting the due process
2 SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 505-06, 488 N.E.2d at 1217-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105-06.
33 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978).
31 Id. at 156, 379 N.E.2d at 1171, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 41. In Sharrock, the plaintiff bailed
her car to the defendant garageman for repair, but she later disputed the charges claimed by
the garageman for work and storage. Id. at 156-57, 379 N.E.2d at 1171-72, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
41-42. The garageman then conducted an ex parte sale of the plaintiff's automobile pursu-
ant to the New York Lien Law. Id. at 157, 379 N.E.2d at 1171-72, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
The plaintiff bought her car back at auction and commenced an action claiming the sale
provisions of the Lien Law violated her due process rights because those provisions author-
ized the sale of her automobile without affording her an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 157,
379 N.E.2d at 1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
'5 See id. at 158, 379 N.E.2d at 1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43. In determining whether
state action existed, the Sharrock court noted that among the more important factors were:
the source of the authority for the private action; whether the State is so entwined
with the regulation of the private conduct as to constitute State activity; whether
there is meaningful State participation in the activity; and whether there has been
a delegation of what has traditionally been a State function to a private person.
Id. (citing Melara v Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3' See Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 159, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (citing Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)). In Flagg Bros., the Supreme Court, confronted with a
federal due process challenge, upheld section 7-210 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
authorized the private sale of property subject to a warehouseman's possessory lien. See id.
at 160. The Flagg Bros. Court found that state action was absent because of the lack of
"overt official involvement." See id. at 157. The Sharrock court noted that the similarities
between the warehouseman's lien in Flagg Bros. and the garageman's lien in Sharrock might
preclude a finding of state action were the federal state action standard applied. See Shar-
rock, 45 N.Y.2d at 159, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
" See Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 159, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
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clause had extended the protection afforded under the New York
constitution beyond that afforded under the federal constitution.3 8
The court also noted the absence of any explicit state action re-
quirement in the New York due process clause.39 It is submitted
that the Sharrock court's expansive interpretation of the state ac-
tion requirement in New York's due process clause provided ample
justification for the SHAD Alliance court to make a similarly ex-
pansive interpretation of the state action requirement in New
York's free speech clause.40
Applying a state action standard more flexible than the federal
standard, the Sharrock court held that state action was present.41
The SHAD Alliance court, however, applied the federal state ac-
tion standard without examining whether the situation called for a
more flexible standard.42 It is suggested that, had it examined the
factors that provide the grounds for a principled divergence from
the federal standard, the SHAD Alliance court could have, and
" See id. The court relied almost exclusively on cases from the area of criminal due
process to support the adoption of a more flexible state action standard than that available
under the federal due process clause. See id.; see, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,
378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978) (criminal due process); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) (same).
39 See Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44. Compare
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law") with N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law"). The Sharrock court also relied on
historical differences between the state and federal due process clauses. See Sharrock, 45
N.Y.2d at 160-61, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
10 It is submitted that the Sharrock court's adoption of a more flexible state action
standard under New York's due process clause was highly persuasive because the SHAD
Alliance court had no free speech cases directly on point from which it could determine
whether New York's free speech provision had been given a broader interpretation than the
first amendment. Although the SHAD Alliance court cited two somewhat analogous cases
involving speech and private property, it is submitted that those cases were inapposite and
should not have been given great weight. In People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832,
384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the question
of the application of the New York Constitution was not before the court. See Bush, 39
N.Y.2d at 533-34, 349 N.E.2d at 834, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 735. In Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886
(1948), the plaintiffs sought access to an apartment complex, a forum that has always been
considered a private one and whose owners do not invite the public to congregate and linger
like the owners of the Smith Haven Mall do.
41 See Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160-61, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
42 The SHAD Alliance court's failure to examine whether a more flexible standard was
called for appears odd in light of the plaintiffs' specific request that the court do so. See
Brief of Respondent at 28; SHAD Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 496, 488 N.E.2d at 1211, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 99 (1985) (urging affirmance on alternative ground of adoption of flexible state
action requirement).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:799
should have, adopted a flexible state action standard that would
have protected the important speech rights of the plaintiffs.
THE EXISTENCE OF GROUNDS FOR DIVERGENCE FROM THE FEDERAL
STANDARD
Commentators urging principled, independent interpretations
of their state constitutions have identified several factors which
might amply justify a state court declining to adopt federal consti-
tutional standards as state doctrine.43 These factors include per-
ceived flaws or eccentricities in the federal doctrine,44 distinctive
state-specific factors such as established case law4" and semantic
differences between state and federal constitutional provisions.46 It
is submitted that these factors were present in SHAD Alliance,
and would have justified a divergence from the federal state action
standard.
The Supreme Court's efforts to define when private property
becomes the functional equivalent of a public forum for state ac-
tion purposes has resulted in inconsistent federal doctrine, 7 and
some commentators have criticized the Court for concluding that a
shopping mall is not the equivalent of a town center.4 s In addition,
the negative proscription of the federal free speech clause contrasts
sharply with the affirmative wording of the New York free speech
clause.49 Moreover, a substantial body of case law has unequivo-
cally established that certain provisions of the New York Constitu-
tion afford more protection than the federal Constitution. It is
"I See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
44 See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1359.
45 See id. at 1360.
40 See id.; see also supra notes 5, 39 and accompanying text (comparing language dif-
ferences between state and federal constitutions).
47 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) "The law in this area... has been less
than clear since Logan Valley analogized a shopping center to the 'company town' in
Marsh .. " Id. at 523. (Powell, J., concurring).
48 See, e.g., S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND THE LAW IN A FREE SociErY 326 (1981) (arguing
shopping centers are public forums); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1166-67 (criticizing Court's
reasoning in public function cases); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan
Valley and The Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1195, 1217-19 (1973) (criticism and
analysis of failure to hold that mall is public forum).
11 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765,
445 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981) (free speech clause affords greater protection); Cooper v. Morin, 49
N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979) (equal protection); Sharrock v. Dell
Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (due process).
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submitted that the combination of these factors in SHAD Alliance
presented a strong opportunity for the court to adopt a more re-
laxed interpretation of the state action standard for the New York
free speech clause. Further, had the court adopted a flexible state
action standard and limited its application exclusively to the exer-
cise of speech-related activities at large shopping malls, the court
could have recognized both the freedom of expression of those
needing access to the mall for effective communication, and the
private property rights of the owners of smaller malls and commer-
cial establishments.51
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
In holding that the New York free speech provision provides
no greater protection than the first amendment, the SHAD Alli-
ance court has closed the only channels of effective communication
available to many groups.52 The task of opening those channels
now rests with the legislature. It is submitted that the legislature
should recognize a right of access to large, private shopping malls
for those who seek to exercise unobtrusive, speech-related
activities.
CONCLUSION
Our system of federalism affords citizens the dual-protection
of both the state and the federal Constitutions. This dual protec-
tion has become ever more important as both the displacement of
traditional public forums by private ones, such as large shopping
malls, and the narrowing of the concept of state action under the
federal Constitution have served to limit free speech protection
available under the first amendment. Protection under our state
constitutions can exist, however, only when courts confer expanded
protection under their state charters in situations which call for
51 See Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Mailing" of
Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 93, 124-26 (1983)(advocating less rigid state action
requirements; but see Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State Consti-
tutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 41 (1986)(urging that no free speech
access is warranted).
52 See, e.g., Note, Private Abridgement, supra note 3, at 166- 67 (pointing out need for
inexpensive channels of communication for certain groups); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 286 (1970) (same). Inexpensive channels of communication
are important because property owners may deny access by setting insuperable financial
requirements.
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principled, expanded interpretations. It is suggested that by failing
to extend greater protection under the New York constitution in a
situation where it was warranted, the SHAD Alliance court has
rendered New York's free speech clause redundant.5 3
Stanley J. Okula, Jr.
5' J. WEINSTEIN, ESSAYS ON THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION 11-18 (1966) (guarantees of
New York's Constitution "only retain vitality as effective protections of liberty where they
provide protection beyond that required under the First Amendment").
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